Date: 20 February 2016 | Time: 10.15am to 12pm | Location: Neill Lecture Theatre, 2nd Floor, Trinity Long Room Hub.

Chair: Professor Alex Schuster, Law School, Trinity College Dublin 

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State-owned Undertakings and Competition Law: A Reassessment of Article 106 TFEU

Mr Christoph Juergens, University of Edinburgh

This paper examines the constraints imposed by EU competition law on undertakings in public ownership. It will be argued that the provision dealing with such undertakings, Art 106 TFEU covers and guides the role of a Member State in the system of a European single market. The central aspect of the norm is dedicated to the balance of competition between Member States which engage in economic behaviour and compete with the private sector, especially in the area of public services. The essay is based upon ECJ decision C-553/12 P DEI v. Commission.

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Addressing Collective Redress: An Assessment of the Impact of EU Initiatives on Collective Redress in Ireland

Ms Shauna Stanley, Trinity College Dublin

This paper will identify the need not only to reform the current mechanisms of collective redress in Ireland which solely provide for injunctive relief, but also the need to introduce more effective forms of collective redress that facilitate compensatory relief. Focusing in particular on the importance of damages for victims of breaches of competition law, the link between the recently adopted EU Antitrust Damages Directive and the Commission Recommendation on Collective Redress will be highlighted as a stepping stone to reform of collective redress in Ireland. The limitations of the Commission’s initiatives without further procedural reform in Ireland will also be discussed.

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How insights from Behavioural Economics can inform Competition Law

Mr Féidhlim McGowan, Trinity College Dublin

This paper explores how the field of behavioural economics can inform competition law. The neoclassical economic model – founded on axioms of rationality – is the cornerstone on which modern competition law is built. However, behavioural economics has shown that individuals display systematic biases and cognitive constraints when making economic decisions. This field of research has thus exposed deficiencies in the neoclassical model. The question then arises as to whether competition law needs to be amended in light of these flaws in its theoretical foundation. By way of illustration, this paper discusses how specific biases and cognitive limitations lead to competitive outcomes not predicted by the neoclassical model.